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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of religious denominations on values and attitudes that are 
thought to be conducive to economic growth and are usually pronounced in favor of Protestants. 
The model is based on the same strategy as in (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002). To isolate the 
effect of religion from other effects, socio-demographic controls such as gender, age, educational 
and income level and country fixed effects are included in all regressions. The analysis uses the 
World Values Survey to investigate twelve attitudes in the overall impact of religious denomina-
tions followed by the analysis controlling for the dominant religion of the country. The paper con-
tributes to the research by: (1) including more Muslim countries, which leads to different results 
from that of (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002) where Muslims represented mostly minority 
religion in researched countries; (2) evaluating precisely the differences between Protestants and 
other religious denominations. The results thus are not dependent on such an unspecified group 
of people who answered that they do not belong to any religious denomination; (3) including new 
attitudes like determination or confidence in major companies that are emphasized especially 
in (Kuran 2011). The results show that neither overall analysis nor analysis with the control for 
dominant religion proved the hypothesis that Protestants have significantly higher values and 
attitudes considered advantageous for economic development compared to other religious deno-
minations. Is it because of the changes of values and attitudes over time?
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Introduction 
Culture is emphasized as one of the fundamental factors of economic 
growth (Acemoglu 2008) and, in the search for cultural aspects of 
economic growth, it has been suggested that religion plays the main 
role. Since the start of this debate when Weber (Weber 1930) identi-
fied the positive effect of Protestant ethics on economic development, 
the majority of research in this area has concentrated on the impact of 
religion on economic attitudes and values conducive to economic 
growth. The research is based on either historical analysis such as 
(Huntington 1997), (Landes 1998) or (Kuran 2005), (Kuran 2011) or 
on statistical analysis using the contemporary data from various sur-
veys and countries, e. g. (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1993), (La 
Porta, et al. 1997), (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002) or (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2006). The historical analysis suggests a num-
ber of pro-growth attitudes and values that are ascribed mostly to 
Protestant countries; the statistical analysis tries to prove these as-
sumptions. Among them generalized trust, thrift, the will to work 
hard, honesty, tolerance and respect for others are usually emphasized 
as positive for economic development whereas intolerance, conserva-
tism, nepotism and low trust in organizations as negative.  
 
Most of the studies evaluating the impact of religion on economic out-
comes use cross-country analysis, nationwide analysis or evaluate one 
or some of the mentioned values and attitudes. The problem of using 
cross-country or nationwide analysis, which is also claimed in (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2002), lies in the fact that there can be other 
historical factors that could keep a country trapped in unhelpful condi-
tions. These factors could disappear over time (usually through re-
form) but “path dependence”  might still influence people’s behavior. 
Lack of curiosity, low generalized trust, low trust in organizations, as 
well as weak civil society leading to the “culture of corruption”, are 
emphasized by (Kuran 2011) as the result of persistent historical in-
fluences in Muslim countries. But the same patterns can also be seen 
in post-communist countries. The problem of distinguishing between 
the effect of religion and other historical factors can be overcome by 
using individual data for a large set of countries. This data can be 
found in the World Values Survey (WVS) including the representative 
national surveys of 97 countries representing almost 90 percent of the 
world's population. This survey is suitable for evaluating the impact of 
religion on values and attitudes, since the questionnaire contains in-
formation about religious affiliations. The WVS in collaboration with 
European Values Study has so far carried out five waves of surveys, 
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from 1981 to 2007. However, there are some limitations in evaluating 
values and attitudes - and especially their development - since each 
wave involves a different set of countries and, for example, most Mus-
lim countries are included in the last two waves only.  
 
This paper investigates the influence of different religious denomina-
tions on values and attitudes that are considered to have an impact on 
economic development. The aim is to find out if Protestants signifi-
cantly differ in researched values and attitudes from other religious 
denominations. The model is based on the same strategy as in (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2002). To isolate the effect of religion from 
other effects, socio-demographic controls such as gender, age, educa-
tional and income level and country fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. The analysis investigates twelve attitudes: generalized 
trust, tolerance and respect for other people, attitudes towards hard 
work, thrift, determination, attitudes towards corruption and cheating 
on taxes, attitudes towards market (confidence in major companies, 
firms and freedom, private vs state ownership of business, income in-
equality) and attitudes towards women. The first part of analysis eval-
uates the overall differences in values and attitudes between 
Protestants and other religious denominations. The second part of 
analysis controls for the dominant religion of the country. For that rea-
son the regressions of all attitudes were carried out separately for 
Protestant, Roman-Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim-dominated coun-
tries.  
 
The paper contributes to the research by including, importantly, more 
Muslim countries  - leading to different results from that of (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2002) where Muslims mostly represented a 
minority religion in the countries in question. The analysis evaluates 
precisely the differences between Protestants and other religious de-
nominations. The results thus are not dependent on such an unspeci-
fied group of people who answered that they do not belong to any re-
ligious denomination. This paper includes also some other attitudes 
like determination or confidence in major companies that are empha-
sized in (Kuran 2011).  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the 
results of theoretical and empirical research on the impact of religion 
on economic development. Data, variables and model are discussed in 
the second section. Section 3 provides the results of the overall impact 
of religious denominations and socio-demographic factors on values 
and attitudes. The results of the impact of the dominant religion of the 
country in question are discussed in the fourth section. It is followed 
by conclusions, with suggestions for future research.  
 
1. Theoretical and empirical  
predictions 
Max Weber (Weber 1930) was the first scholar to point out the signif-
icant role of religion for economic growth. Weber’s argument explains 
the positive effect of Protestant ethics on economic development. This 
was the motivation for a lot of research in this topic. For example, 
(Samuelsson 1993) claims that most of the capitalist institutions de-
scribed by Weber existed before the Protestant Reformation. The work 
by (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1993) attributes the prevailing lack 
of trust toward others in the South to the strong Catholic tradition. 
This theory was partially proved by (La Porta, et al. 1997) and 
(Inglehart 1999). The work by (Landes 1998) emphasizes the influ-
ence of the culture of intolerance diffused by the Catholic Church, 
which forced out many educated and talented people, resulting in fail-
ure of Spain to develop in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century. (Huntington 1997) 
and (Landes 1998) also emphasize the impact of religion on economic 
development by affecting personal behavior and values such as hones-
ty, thrift, the will to work hard etc. According to them, Protestantism 
was supportive in history in developing property rights and written 
contracts, which led to higher business driving for higher competition 
and technological progress. Private property - and laws ensuring its 
existence - positively influenced the later division of power between 
secular and Church. Secularization is also stressed by the above-
mentioned authors as the positive factor of economic development in 
Europe. The work by (Becker and Woessmann 2009) modified the 
argument of the positive effect of Protestantism in terms of education-
al level. The authors claimed that it was not Protestant ethics that led 
to economic growth, but the translation of the Bible into the languages 
in use that led to a higher educational level of the population as the 
base for the economic growth in Protestant countries. The role of reli-
gion for education and economic development was studied in Jewish 
history, too. (Botticini and Eckstein 2005) emphasized the transfor-
mation of Jewish religion about the year 70 A.D. towards understand-
ing Tora. Each Jew was responsible for teaching his sons to read and 
understand Jewish rules. This was supposed to give Jews a competi-
tive advantage in the form of higher human capital. 
 
(Blum and Dudley 2001) tested growth theories in the period of 1500-
1750 and did not prove Weber’s hypothesis about the positive impact 
of Protestant ethics on economic growth in Europe either. On the other 
hand, they supported some of Weber’s hypotheses, e.g. positive influ-
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ence of information networks, high level of specialization of 
Protestant cities and the observation of contracts among people who 
did not know each other.  
 
In terms of Islam, so-called Islamic culture and Islamic law are com-
monly considered as a burden to economic growth. (Huntington 1997) 
or (Landes 1998) claim that the conviction that God is unique, al-
mighty, sovereign and eternal, and disposes of lives and properties of 
his subjects led not only to a lack of freedom and limited property 
rights suppressing business, competition and economic development, 
but also to fatalism. Other factors usually stressed in relation to Islam 
are personalism, laziness, conservatism, traditionalism, lack of curi-
osity, and mistrust of science. On the other hand, (Kuran 2005) and 
(Kuran 2011) tries to explain the economic underdevelopment in the 
Muslim world in inadequate institutions. He claims that all of the pre-
viously mentioned characteristics cannot be denied, but that they can 
be seen in other religions, too. Kuran emphasizes that the characteris-
tics of human behavior mentioned are symptoms of institutional defi-
ciencies that started to come to light in times of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the western civilizations in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. The 
Middle East suffered from a lack of adequate organizational capabili-
ties to use new technologies. Islamic law formed a system of institu-
tions that are responsible for the low economic level of the Muslim 
world. These institutions include law of partnerships, inheritance regu-
lations and waqf. As (Kuran 2011) says “these elements of Islamic 
law delayed the transition from personal to impersonal exchange, dis-
couraged the use of the technologies of mass production, kept civil 
society weak, and set the stage for sustained authoritarian rule”.   
 
The impact of past institutions (history) on the efficiency of contem-
poraneous institutions is supported also by (North 1981), (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001) or (Tabellini 2008). Whereas the litera-
ture in political economics seeks to explain this persistence with refer-
ence to conflicts over the distribution of income and wealth, (Tabellini 
2008) emphasizes also the impact of values and behavior of public 
officials, or of private individuals inside private or public organiza-
tions. On the basis of his research from the micro data on second gen-
eration US citizens, distant political institutions have left their mark 
on current attitudes and values, as measured by trust and respect. As 
(Tabellini 2008) says “Descendents of immigrants from countries that 
over a century ago were ruled by more democratic political institu-
tions, are more likely today to display generalized trust and respect for 
others”. It is also confirmed by aggregate data on European regions 
(Tabellini 2010). (Tabellini 2008) also stresses the contemporaneous 
link between values such as trust and institutional and economic out-
comes.  
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The impact of religion on economic attitudes and values was studied 
also by (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002) with positive findings. 
They studied the effect of religion on people’s attitudes toward coop-
eration, government, women, legal rules, the market economy, and 
thriftiness, and found a remarkable number of regularities. They con-
cluded that, on the whole, religion is good for the development of atti-
tudes that are conducive to economic growth.  
 
Although the majority of research on this topic concentrates on the 
impact of religion on economic attitudes and values conducive to eco-
nomic growth, work by (Barro and McCleary 2003) uses a cross-
country panel to study the interaction between religiosity and econom-
ic growth in growth equations. The same approach studying the direct 
impact of religion to economic growth was used by (Grier 1997) in a 
cross-country study of former British, French, and Spanish colonies. 
The results show that Protestantism is correlated positively with 
growth and development. 
 
 
 

2. Methodology and data 
All regressions are based on the model using the same strategy as in 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002), i. e. controlling for individual 
country effects to eliminate the impact of other institutional variables 
and the level of economic development of the country. As (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2002) emphasized, there is a risk of underesti-
mating the effect of religion as a part of the national culture. On the 
other hand, this approach makes it possible to show the effect of reli-
gion with more credibility.  
 
So, the analyzed equation looks like this: 
 
 
where Yij  stands for 1…j values and attitudes, Religious denominationi 
represents different categories of religious denominations and γ is the 
coefficient of our interest. The matrix Xi  contains socio-demographic 
controls (age, gender, education and income level). 
 
The model is verified using the data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) which is a cross-country project including the representative 
national surveys of 97 countries representing almost 90 percent of the 
world's population. This survey is suitable for evaluating values and 
attitudes and their impact on social, economic and political life. The 
WVS in collaboration with European Values Study carried out five 
waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007. But each wave contains a dif-
ferent set of countries and only the last two waves contain the highest 
number of countries. In particular, the majority of Muslim countries 
are included in the last two waves only. On the other hand, Denmark 
and Iceland representing Protestant countries are not included in the 
fifth wave, which would decline the sample of Protestants significant-
ly. For those reasons, the analysis in this paper is based on the data 
from the fourth wave of WVS including 71 countries or regions with 
the total of 102 264 observations of individuals.  
 
Dependent variables are values and attitudes considered important for 
economic development in theoretical and empirical literature. Some 
are supposed to have positive economic impact, such as generalized 
trust, tolerance and respect for others, thrift, hard work, determination, 
honesty, while the others have negative economic impact. Among 
them nepotism, justification of corruption and low trust in organiza-
tions are stressed in literature most frequently. Attitude towards wom-
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en is chosen because of its obvious impact on labor market decisions. 
The analysis includes also the attitudes towards market because pro-
market policies are supposed to be positive for economic growth. 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the dependent variables. The 
first two variables represent the attitudes towards others. Variable la-
beled generalized trust is based on the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people?“ The variable is equal 
to 1 if respondents answer that most people can be trusted and zero 
otherwise. Variable two which is labeled tolerance and respect for 
other people is based on the question: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.” Re-
spondents could choose from 17 child qualities and one of them is tol-
erance and respect for other people. Variables 3, 4 and 5 are based on 
the same question since they represent other child qualities considered 
to be important. Variable three represents “thrift saving money and 
things”, variable 4 “hard work” and variable 5 “determination”.  
 
Variable 6 and 7 can approximate honesty and the attitude towards 
corruption that are also emphasized as important for economic out-
comes. They are both based on the question: “Please tell me for each 
of the following statements whether you think it can always be justi-
fied, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.” An-
swers are in the range 1 – 10, with 1 = never justifiable and 10 = al-
ways justifiable. Variable 6 represents “cheating on taxes if you have 
a chance” and variable 7 “someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties”.  
 
Attitudes towards the market include variables 8, 9, 10 and 11. Varia-
ble 8 labeled confidence in major companies is based on the following 
question: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: 1- is it 
a great deal of confidence, 2 - quite a lot of confidence, 3 - not very 
much confidence or 4 - none at all?” And confidence in major com-
panies represents one of the institutions mentioned. Variables 9 la-
beled firms and freedom, 10 labeled private vs state ownership of 
business and 11 labeled income inequality are based on the question:  
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would 
you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely 
with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, 
you can choose any number in between.” Statements on the one side 
are the opposite of the statements on the other, which is why the 
statements reported further are only those on the left side. Variable 9 
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represents the statement “State should give more freedom to firms”, 
variable 10 “Private ownership of business should be increased” and 
variable 11 “Incomes should be made more equal”. Last variable 
number 12 refers to the attitude towards women and is based on the 
following question: “Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a 
job than women.” Possible answers are 1 agree, 2 disagree, 3 neither. 
Fortunately the answer 3 neither is not numerous and to put it together 
with either answer 1 agree or 2 disagree does not bring significant 
changes in results compared to the case if the analysis is limited to the 
observations where respondents answered 1 agree or 2 disagree. In 
this analysis the answer number 3 “neither” is merged with the first 
category, i.e. answer 1 “agree” because it is more probable that people 
who do not follow the mainstream convention in the modern devel-
oped world about equality for men and women choose the noncom-
mittal response. Also, the descriptive results in Protestant, Muslim, 
Catholic and Orthodox countries support this statement. But, as was 
emphasized before, the third category is not numerous enough to bring 
significant differences if you merge the third category with either first 
or  second one compared to the case if the analysis is restricted only to 
the observations where respondents answer either “agree” or “disa-
gree”.  
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of population by religious denomina-
tions and country. Religious denomination is based on the question: 
“Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes: which one?”. Re-
ligion denomination is the explanatory variable of the main interest in 
this research. The shares of religious denominations on the population 
of the country are used in the second part of the research when taking 
into account dominant religion of the country. They are based on the 
mentioned question from WVS rather than on other sources such as 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) factbook. But the results in 
the table   were checked with the reports of CIA factbook and World 
Christian Encyclopedia and there are significant differences using dif-
ferent sources of data for some countries such as China, the Czech 
Republic or Nigeria. But such countries were excluded from the anal-
ysis anyway on the basis that they do not fulfill the condition for dom-
inant religion of the country. In this paper, only countries where more 
than 50 percent of the population belongs to the same religious de-
nomination are considered as countries with a dominant religion. The 
fourth wave includes 71 countries or regions and this full sample con-
taining 102 264 observations of individuals was used in the first part 
of the analysis that does not deal with the distribution of population by 
religious denominations in the country. The second part of the analy-
sis works only with the countries fulfilling the condition for dominant 
religion of the country. Countries or regions included in the second 
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part of analysis are reported in the table 3, the excluded countries are: 
Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Canada, China, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Moroc-
co, Netherlands, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Singapore, Vietnam, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ukraine, Tanzania, United States, 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Other control variables include gender, age, educational and income 
level and country-fixed effects. Table 2 reports the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents. “Female” is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the respondent is male and two if it is a female. “Age” 
is expressed in years. “Education” is a three level index recoded from 
the highest educational level attained on a country basis. “Income” is a 
three level index recoded from the question: “Here is a scale of in-
comes. We would like to know in what group your household is, count-
ing all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just 
give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and 
other deductions.” (Income categories are coded by deciles for each 
society, 1 = lowest decile, 10 = highest decile). 
 
3. The impact of different religious 
denominations and socio-demo-
graphic factors 
The results (table 4 and 5) show that different religious denominations 
do not play a role in explaining the differences in generalized trust, 
tolerance and respect for other people, thrift and attitudes towards 
freedom of firms and inequality of incomes. The results are surprising, 
especially in the case of generalized trust because greater trust is em-
phasized most frequently as the positive factor for better economic 
outcomes and is mostly ascribed to Protestants. Coefficients of differ-
ent religions show that there are no statistically significant differences 
between Protestant and other religious categories in generalized trust 
and Muslims, Jews and Hindus record even greater trust.   
 
Figure 1 Generalized trust 
 
 
Note: The results in figures 1 to 12 show regression coefficients for religious catego-
ries. Protestants represent the base category to which others are compared. White 
bars  represent statistically insignificant differences between Protestants and certain 
religions; grey represents significance at the 5 percent level; light grey at the 10 per-
cent level and dark grey at the 1 percent level. 
 
Referring to tolerance and respect for other people, only Jews are sig-
nificantly more tolerant than Protestants (but only at the 10 percent 
level). Except Muslims and Buddhists, other religious categories also 
record greater tolerance although statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 2 Tolerance and respect for other people 
 
 
Thrift is significantly greater than Protestants only among Catholics at 
the 5 percent level. Other religious categories - except Muslims and 
Jews - tend to be more thrifty , though not significantly.   
 
Figure 3 Thrift 
  
 
Attitudes towards state control of firms are significantly higher among 
Jews, Orthodox and nonreligious people compared to Protestants. Un-
fortunately this question was asked only in 33 countries , excluded 
from which was the majority of Muslim countries. Only results for 
Hindus and Buddhists show a greater tendency towards freedom of 
firms (but statistically insignificant). 
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Figure 4 Firms and freedom 
 
 
All religious categories tend to be more in favor of income equality 
compared to Protestants but differences are not statistically signifi-
cant.  
 
Figure 5 Income inequality 
 
 
For the rest of researched attitudes (i.e. hard work, determination, atti-
tudes towards women,  cheating on taxes, accepting a bribe, confi-
dence in major companies, state ownership of business) religion is an 
important factor since the test of the overall impact of religion is sta-
tistically significant for those attitudes. Attitude towards hard work is 
significantly lower for Jewish and higher for Hindu compared to 
Protestant category.  
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Figure 6 Hard work 
 
 
Determination is lower for Muslims (at the 10 percent level) and sig-
nificantly higher for Hindus and people without religion. 
 
Figure 7 Determination  
 
 
Cheating on taxes is more justifiable among Jew, Roman Catholics 
and people without religion than Protestants. Only Orthodox and Mus-
lim categories tend to justify cheating on taxes less than Protestants 
but the differences are small and not statistically significant.   
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Figure 8 Justifiable cheating on taxes 
 
 
Accepting a bribe is significantly more justifiable among Catholics 
(but only at the 10 percent level) and people without religion than 
Protestants. Orthodox, Jews, Muslims and Hindus tend to justify ac-
cepting a bribe less than Protestants but the results are not statistically 
significant.    
 
Figure 9 Justifiable accepting a bribe 
 
 
Confidence in major companies can be explained by religion too since 
the overall impact of religion is significant. However, only Catholics 
have significantly greater confidence in major companies compared to 
Protestants although only at the 10 percent level. Muslim category in-
dicates lower confidence (although not statistically significant) as 
supposed by (Kuran 2011).  
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Figure 10 Confidence in major companies 
 
 
Orthodox, Hindus, Muslims and people without religion would prefer 
more government ownership of firms compared to Protestants, other 
religious denominations are not significantly different from 
Protestants. 
 
Figure 11 State ownership of business 
 
 
Attitude towards women differs significantly according to religion. 
Among Muslims there is greater agreement about men having more 
right to a job than women when jobs are scarce. On the other hand, 
Orthodox and people without religion are significantly more progres-
sive regarding gender issues than Protestants. All other religious cate-
gories tend to be more conservative in the attitudes towards women 
but the results are not statistically significant.  
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Figure 12 Men more right to a job 
 
Socio-demographic factors 
Gender plays a role in almost all attitudes except thrift and confidence 
in major companies. Women have lower trust in other people, lower 
attitudes towards hard work and determination, are more tolerant and 
respectful, are less willing to justify cheating on taxes, less willing to 
justify someone accepting a bribe and tend to prefer a more regulated 
economy (higher state control and ownership of business, income 
equality). And they are of course more in favor of attitude towards 
women. 
 
Age is also significant in the majority of evaluated attitudes. Age does 
not seem to be important in the case of tolerance and respect for other 
people, confidence in major companies, attitudes towards state owner-
ship of business and income inequality. On the other hand, higher age 
is connected with higher trust, higher thrift, higher attitudes towards 
hard work and lower determination. Older people tend to be less will-
ing to justify cheating on taxes, someone accepting a bribe and prefer 
higher state control of firms. They are also more conservative regard-
ing the attitude towards women. Although the results are in line with 
assumptions, age is not necessarily only a signal of aging but also the 
indicator of changing values and attitudes over time that can be caused 
by changes in religions or country specific factors like institutions and 
economic development of the countries.  
 
Educational and income level may pose endogeneity problems espe-
cially in some attitudes such as attitudes towards hard work or deter-
mination. The results thus indicate correlations rather than causal ef-
fects. Higher educational level is connected with higher trust, more 
tolerance and respect for other people, higher determination, but lower 
thrift and lower attitudes towards hard work. More educated people 
are also less willing to justify cheating on taxes or someone accepting 
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a bribe, trust major companies less and are more in favor of liberal 
markets and same rights regarding gender. 
 
Higher income level is correlated with higher trust, higher tolerance, 
higher determination, higher confidence in major companies, higher 
attitudes towards liberal markets and more progressive attitudes to-
wards women. On the other hand, higher income level is connected 
with lower thrift and lower attitudes towards hard work.   
4. The impact of dominant religion 
on differences among religious 
denominations 
It is interesting to see whether differences between Protestants and 
people of other religious denominations vary in Protestant-dominant 
countries and those where Protestants represent a minority religion. 
Tables 6 - 11 report the differences among religious denominations in 
dependence on the dominant religion of the country. The regressions 
were carried out for Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim-
dominated countries. Other religious denominations were not consid-
ered since they are dominant either only in one country or in no coun-
try.  
 
The previous analysis showed that Protestants do not report significant 
differences compared to other religious denominations in 5 of 12 re-
searched attitudes - generalized trust, tolerance and respect for other 
people, thrift and attitudes towards freedom of firms and inequality of 
incomes. However, when controlling for dominant religion of the 
country, results show significant differences among some religious 
denominations in the observed subgroups of countries. For example, 
Catholics, Muslims and Buddhists report lower trust in other people 
compared to Protestants in Muslim countries. Trust is also significant-
ly lower for Jews in Protestant countries. To sum up, when there is a 
significant difference between Protestants and other religious denomi-
nations, it is in favor of higher trust in the Protestant category.   
 
On the other hand, the analysis controlling for the dominant religion 
of the country did not prove that Protestants would be necessarily 
stronger in attitudes conducive to economic growth in Protestant-
dominant countries. Referring to tolerance and respect for other peo-
ple Jews are significantly less tolerant than Protestants but Muslims 
show greater tolerance compared to Protestants in Protestant coun-
tries. In the case of thrift, Buddhists and Catholics are less thrifty but 
Jews more than Protestants. Hard work is less emphasized in upbring-
ing among Buddhists and Jews but other religions do not differ to 
Protestants. Determination is more stressed among people without re-
ligion and Hindus but less among Jews. In the attitude towards cheat-
ing on taxes there is no significant difference between religious cate-
gories and only Jews justify accepting a bribe significantly more than 
Protestants in Protestant countries. In the attitudes towards market the 
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results show the highest differences between religions. In the case of 
confidence in major companies Hindus are more confident but Jews 
and people without religion tend to trust major companies less. Bud-
dhists and Orthodox are more in favor of freedom of firms than 
Protestants but Jews report the opposite attitude. Catholics and Hindus 
prefer higher state ownership of business but Orthodox would support 
opposite. Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and people without religion would 
prefer higher income equality than Protestants. On the other hand, 
Muslims and Orthodox are more for larger income differences than 
Protestants in Protestant countries. In the case of attitudes towards 
women only Jews appear to be more conservative than Protestants and 
believe that men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce.  
The problem of the analysis of the impact of dominant religion lies in 
the low number of observations in some religious categories in the 
subgroups of countries. But it is not possible to expect more people of 
other religions in the countries where more than 50 percent of the 
population belongs to the same religious denomination. The results are 
thus the most reliable for Protestants and Catholics in Protestant and 
Catholic-dominated countries where there is a sufficient number of 
observations in each religious category. There are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between Protestants and Catholics in Protestant 
and Catholic-dominated countries in ten of twelve research attitudes. 
Catholics are only less thrifty and more for state ownership of busi-
ness than Protestants in Protestant countries and do not differ in Cath-
olic ones.   
 
To sum up, the data shows that generally there are differences in val-
ues and attitudes between Protestants and other religious denomina-
tions when taking into account dominant religion of a country. How-
ever, the differences in values and attitudes among religious denomi-
nations in Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim countries are 
not necessarily only caused by the dominancy of some religion but 
also by the level of economic development,  institutions and other as-
pects of the country.  This is because the country´s fixed effects are 
valid only for the subgroup of the countries with the same dominant 
religion and these countries are significantly correlated with the level 
of economic development and the range of democratic institutions es-
pecially in the case of Protestant and Muslim countries.  
 
Socio-demographic factors in Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and 
Muslim countries show differences in the relevancy and also in the 
trend which, in the case of age, may indicate that age does not need to 
represent the pattern of aging but changes in values and attitudes over 
time in the observed subgroups of countries. More research needs to 
be done to prove this hypothesis. 
Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of different religious denominations 
on values and attitudes. The aim was to find out if Protestants differ 
significantly from other religions in values and attitudes considered 
conducive to economic development. The analysis, based on the mod-
el using, apart from religious denominations, other socio-demographic 
controls and country-fixed effects, was divided into two parts. The 
first part examined the overall impact of religious denominations on 
the sample of 71 countries containing 102 264 observations of indi-
viduals. The second part controlled also for the dominant religion of 
the country and the differences in values and attitudes among religious 
denominations were evaluated separately for the Protestant, Catholic, 
Orthodox and Muslim-dominated countries.  
 
The first part of the analysis showed that Protestants do not report sig-
nificant differences compared to other religious denominations in 5 
out of the 12 researched attitudes - generalized trust, tolerance and re-
spect for other people, thrift and attitudes towards freedom of firms 
and inequality of incomes. The results are surprising especially in the 
case of generalized trust because this attitude is emphasized the most 
often as the factor influencing different economic outcomes and is 
more pronounced in favor of Protestants.  
 
The analysis of other values and attitudes does not prove that 
Protestants have definitely better attitudes relating to economic out-
comes. Referring to attitudes towards hard work, only Jews consider 
hard work less important and Hindus even more than Protestants. De-
termination is lower for Muslims (at the 10 percent level) and signifi-
cantly higher for Hindus and people without religion. Some attitudes 
are more in line with assumptions like cheating on taxes which is 
more justifiable among Jews and Roman Catholics (at the 10 percent 
level) and people without religion; accepting a bribe is also more justi-
fied among Catholics (at the 10 percent level) and people without reli-
gion; Muslims, Orthodox and Hindus prefer more government owner-
ship of firms and Muslims are also more conservative in attitudes to-
wards women. Confidence in major companies did not prove the 
statement supposed by (Kuran 2011) that Muslims have lower trust in 
them.   
 
When controlling for dominant religion of the country, results show 
significant differences among some religious denominations in the 
observed subgroups of countries. For example, in the case of trust, if 
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there is a significant difference between Protestants and other reli-
gious denominations in the subgroups of countries, it is in favor of 
higher trust in Protestant category. When it comes to other attitudes, 
Protestants do not prove to be definitely stronger in attitudes condu-
cive to economic growth even in Protestant-dominant countries.  
 
In summary, neither overall analysis nor analysis with the control for 
dominant religion proved the hypothesis that Protestants have signifi-
cantly higher values and attitudes that are considered beneficial for 
economic development compared to other religious denominations. 
 
Although socio-demographic factors in the first part of the analysis 
give results mostly in accordance with assumptions, there are some 
interesting results. Higher education and income level is correlated 
with lower thrift and lower attitude towards hard work. Socio-
demographic factors in Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim 
countries show differences in the relevancy and also in the trend 
which in the case of age can indicate that age does not need to repre-
sent the pattern of aging but the changes of values and attitudes over 
time in the observed subgroups of countries. This might be a further 
step in researching the differences in values and attitudes among reli-
gions: Have attitudes changed over time in the individual religions or 
in the countries with specific dominant religion? Were Protestant val-
ues and attitudes more in favor of economic outcomes compared to 
other religions in times when Weber wrote his article?  
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Table 1 Summary statistics of values and attitudes 
Variable Obs Median Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Attitudes towards others 
      
1. Generalized trust  98423 0 0,29 0,45 0 1 
2. Tolerance and respect for other people  101063 1 0,70 0,46 0 1 
Attitudes towards thrift, work, determina-
tion, honesty, corruption       
3. Thrift  101065 0 0,35 0,48 0 1 
4. Hard work  98746 1 0,57 0,49 0 1 
5. Determination 98729 0 0,35 0,48 0 1 
6. Is cheating on taxes justifiable? 91807 1 2,23 2,20 1 10 
7. Is accepting a bribe justifiable? 97276 1 1,67 1,63 1 10 
Attitudes towards the market 
      
8. Confidence in major companies 70031 3 2,62 0,90 1 4 
9. Firms and freedom 38604 5 5,44 2,90 1 10 
10. Private vs state ownership of business 77955 5 5,09 2,91 1 10 
11. Income inequality 86832 6 5,84 3,09 1 10 
Attitude towards women 
      
12. When jobs are scarce, men should have 
more right to a job than women 98722 1 1,49 0,50 1 2 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics of socio-demographic characteristics 
Variable  Obs Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 102216 2 1,52 0,50 1 2 
Age 102023 39 41,14 16,32 15 101 
Education 101378 2 1,81 0,74 1 3 
Income 87868 2 1,95 0,79 1 3 
 
Table 3 Percentages of population by religious denominations and country 
Country  Protestant Roman 
Catholic 
Orthodox Jew Muslim Sunni Buddhist Hindu Others 
Austria 
 
5,06 78,98 0,66 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,85 
Albania 
 
0,00 8,80 18,00 0,00 58,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,90 
Argentina 
 
0,39 78,28 0,08 0,78 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,00 7,27 
Bangladesh 
 
0,13 0,13 0,07 0,07 91,87 0,00 0,47 7,13 0,00 
Belgium 
 
1,15 54,86 0,37 0,10 3,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,29 
Bulgaria 
 
0,70 0,30 60,30 0,00 8,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 
Chile 
 
2,00 53,67 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 9,83 
Croatia 
 
0,00 84,55 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,79 
Denmark 
 
86,12 0,78 0,00 0,00 0,49 0,00 0,10 0,10 1,37 
Finland 
 
83,72 0,10 1,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,89 
France 
 
1,30 52,63 1,18 1,36 0,06 0,00 0,19 0,12 0,43 
Greece 
 
0,00 1,49 93,43 0,44 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,26 
Iceland 
 
90,60 0,41 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,24 
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India 
 
0,00 2,95 0,00 0,25 10,84 0,00 1,40 72,23 4,35 
Indonesia 
 
0,00 6,47 0,00 0,00 92,53 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 
Iran 
 
0,00 0,95 0,00 0,00 97,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,67 
Iraq 
 
0,00 0,22 0,13 0,00 60,99 12,13 0,00 0,00 25,94 
Ireland 
 
1,98 88,83 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 1,78 
Israel 
 
0,00 3,25 0,00 85,32 9,51 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,83 
Italy 
 
0,30 81,15 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,25 
Jordan 
 
0,00 4,34 0,00 0,00 95,58 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
1,34 0,38 7,48 0,77 74,30 0,00 0,19 0,10 0,29 
Lithuania 
 
1,28 74,56 2,95 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,00 1,08 
Luxembourg 
 
0,17 63,83 0,41 0,58 0,58 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,64 
Malta 
 
0,90 97,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 
Mexico 
 
1,43 72,31 0,00 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,13 4,89 
Moldova 
 
1,19 2,68 87,30 1,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,40 
Norway 
 
84,12 1,06 0,71 0,00 0,62 0,00 0,09 0,00 3,73 
Pakistan 
 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 53,35 0,00 0,00 17,50 
Peru 
 
0,00 82,35 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,00 11,06 
Philippines 
 
1,86 72,53 0,00 0,00 3,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 10,74 
Poland 
 
0,27 93,97 0,27 0,00 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,73 
Portugal 
 
0,30 85,60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,40 
Puerto Rico 
 
13,19 57,22 0,00 1,39 0,00 0,00 3,47 0,00 12,36 
Romania 
 
2,01 7,42 84,73 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,44 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 97,00 0,00 0,00 0,33 2,26 
Slovakia 
 
11,19 64,16 0,83 0,23 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,53 
Slovenia 
 
0,30 66,10 1,59 0,00 1,09 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,60 
Spain 
 
0,75 80,82 0,04 0,04 0,17 0,00 0,08 0,04 0,54 
Sweden 
 
68,87 1,58 0,49 0,00 0,39 0,00 0,00 0,39 2,96 
Turkey 
 
0,00 0,24 0,02 0,07 96,81 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 
Macedonia 
 
0,38 0,28 59,43 0,09 25,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,19 
Egypt 
 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 94,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,63 
Great Britain 
 
56,60 13,60 0,20 0,60 0,90 0,00 0,60 0,50 10,80 
Venezuela 
 
6,67 65,58 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,25 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
 
0,27 5,88 74,38 0,09 12,12 0,00 0,04 0,00 1,33 
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Table 4 Religious denominations and values and attitudes 
 Generalized 
trust 
Tolerance 
and re-
spect for 
others 
Thrift Hard 
work 
Determination Men 
more 
right to a 
job 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion -0.018 0.014 0.008 -0.017 0.062*** 0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
Others -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.020* -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
Buddhist -0.004 -0.012 0.039 0.017 0.049 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) 
Hindu 0.015 0.003 0.012 0.073*** 0.062*** -0.015 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.050) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) 
Jew 0.044 0.069* -0.044 -
0.083*** 
-0.024 -0.017 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.043) (0.029) (0.022) (0.034) 
Muslim 0.015 -0.013 -0.008 0.029 -0.032* -
0.070*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) 
Orthodox -0.020 0.012 0.010 -0.024 0.029 0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018) 
Roman Catholic -0.015 0.006 0.024** 0.002 0.011 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Female -0.008** 0.035*** -0.0003 -
0.036*** 
-0.021*** 0.111*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Age 0.001*** -0.0001 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -
0.003*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Education 0.042*** 0.026*** -
0.054*** 
-
0.029*** 
0.055*** 0.078*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Income 0.021*** 0.011*** -
0.017*** 
-
0.011*** 
0.031*** 0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.159*** 0.617*** 0.412*** 0.579*** 0.240*** 1.342*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) 
       
Observations 81,619 83,438 83,440 81,198 81,184 81,780 
Number of 
countries/regions 
69 68 68 67 67 68 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.008 0.004 0.016 0.013 0.020 0.055 
Overall impact 
of religion (Prob 
> F) 
0.3002 0.2152 0.1588 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Religious denominations and values and attitudes (cont.) 
 Justifiable 
cheating 
on taxes 
Justifiable 
accepting 
a bribe 
Confidence 
in major 
companies 
Firms 
and free-
dom 
State ow-
nership of 
business 
Inequality 
of income 
Religion: b Pro-
testant 
      
No religion 0.261*** 0.195*** 0.041 0.301* 0.407*** -0.031 
 (0.065) (0.055) (0.030) (0.149) (0.107) (0.065) 
Others -0.069 0.020 -0.015 0.113 0.183 0.066 
 (0.075) (0.083) (0.039) (0.158) (0.194) (0.072) 
Buddhist 0.182 0.202 -0.014 -0.003 -0.049 -0.020 
 (0.166) (0.130) (0.033) (0.770) (0.219) (0.111) 
Hindu 0.008 -0.128 0.096 -0.359 0.729*** -0.187 
 (0.271) (0.325) (0.075) (0.859) (0.218) (0.150) 
Jew 0.436** -0.348 0.015 0.956** 0.132 -0.081 
 (0.175) (0.312) (0.049) (0.363) (0.182) (0.226) 
Muslim -0.004 -0.016 0.021 0.369 0.356** -0.012 
 (0.116) (0.066) (0.040) (0.239) (0.170) (0.104) 
Orthodox -0.002 -0.065 0.029 0.384** 0.429*** -0.014 
 (0.120) (0.067) (0.046) (0.165) (0.138) (0.093) 
Roman Catholic 0.118* 0.102* -0.055* 0.125 0.166 -0.041 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.032) (0.110) (0.111) (0.068) 
Female -0.249*** -0.132*** 0.007 0.297*** 0.388*** -
0.129*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) 
Age -0.018*** -0.011*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education -0.075*** -0.088*** 0.028*** -
0.301*** 
-0.306*** 0.306*** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.009) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) 
Income 0.015 -0.011 -0.040*** -
0.301*** 
-0.306*** 0.258*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.026) (0.041) (0.030) 
Constant 3.104*** 2.350*** 2.597*** 5.880*** 5.773*** 4.907*** 
 (0.089) (0.075) (0.038) (0.169) (0.175) (0.122) 
       
Observations 75,639 80,522 57,479 32,386 65,131 72,197 
Number of 
countries/regions 
66 69 51 33 56 60 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.022 0.016 0.002 0.028 0.026 0.016 
Overall impact 
of religion (Prob 
> F) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0093 0.1421 0.0000 0.6157 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: justifiable cheating on taxes, justifiable accepting a bribe: the scale of responses -  1 = 
never justifiable, 10 = always justifiable 
confidence in major companies: the scale of responses – 1 = a great deal, 4 = none at all 
firms and freedom – 1= state should give more freedom to firms, 10 = state should control firms 
more effectively 
state ownership of business – 1 = private ownership of business should be increased, 10 = gov-
ernment ownership of business should be increased 
income inequality – 1= incomes should be made more equal, 10 = we need larger income dif-
ferences as incentives 
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Table 6 The role of dominant religion – generalized trust and toler-
ance and respect for others 
 Generalized trust Tolerance and respect for other people 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion -0.001 0.012 -0.119 -0.180 0.022 -0.015 -0.030 0.036 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.151) (0.102) (0.018) (0.018) (0.089) (0.043) 
Others 0.014 0.024 -0.084 -0.311** 0.023 -0.017 -0.184* -0.053 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.195) (0.107) (0.031) (0.035) (0.078) (0.058) 
Buddhist 0.024 0.011  -
0.320*** 
0.027 -0.055  0.048 
 (0.026) (0.050)  (0.082) (0.188) (0.046)  (0.045) 
Hindu 0.100 0.151  -0.184 0.016 0.184***  -0.078* 
 (0.308) (0.167)  (0.103) (0.141) (0.025)  (0.040) 
Jew -
0.336*** 
0.076 -0.165 -0.098 -
0.075*** 
0.014 0.011 0.127* 
 (0.017) (0.047) (0.149) (0.123) (0.013) (0.034) (0.078) (0.066) 
Muslim -0.269 -0.003 -0.020 -0.220* 0.174*** 0.102*** -0.058 -0.036 
 (0.188) (0.047) (0.158) (0.103) (0.020) (0.023) (0.081) (0.050) 
Orthodox -0.015 -0.053 -0.128 -0.204 -0.018 -0.033 -0.078 0.061 
 (0.173) (0.046) (0.159) (0.124) (0.020) (0.042) (0.085) (0.037) 
Roman Catholic -0.034 0.017 -0.039 -0.235* 0.025 -0.003 -0.142* -0.010 
 (0.069) (0.021) (0.139) (0.125) (0.038) (0.014) (0.065) (0.056) 
Female 0.006 -0.017** -
0.032*** 
-0.010* 0.078*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age -0.0002 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** -0.0001 -0.0004* 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.253*** -0.021 0.154 0.558*** 0.640*** 0.629*** 0.651*** 0.691*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.179) (0.129) (0.049) (0.022) (0.074) (0.062) 
         
Observations 5,109 22,076 4,509 17,146 5,254 21,677 4,726 18,041 
Number of 
countries/regions 
6 21 5 10 6 20 5 10 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.058 0.023 0.012 0.004 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 The role of dominant religion – thrift and attitude towards 
women 
 Thrift Men more right to a job 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion -0.026 0.001 -0.088** 0.014 -0.010 0.083*** -0.016 0.095 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.031) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.051) (0.079) 
Others -0.026 0.030 -
0.205*** 
0.000 -0.032 0.023 -0.219 -0.055 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.043) (0.016) (0.145) (0.075) 
Buddhist -
0.241*** 
-0.012  -0.091** 0.077 0.018  0.224 
 (0.035) (0.050)  (0.037) (0.248) (0.054)  (0.140) 
Hindu -0.063 -0.074  -0.034 -0.059 -0.082  -0.075 
 (0.198) (0.204)  (0.031) (0.112) (0.263)  (0.043) 
Jew 0.171*** -0.017 -0.037 -0.056 -
0.196*** 
-0.014 -0.147 -0.107 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.098) (0.262) (0.015) (0.065) (0.138) (0.061) 
Muslim -0.053 0.015 -0.169 -0.001 -0.207 -0.071 -0.099* -0.099* 
 (0.068) (0.041) (0.097) (0.021) (0.201) (0.120) (0.042) (0.048) 
Orthodox -0.035 0.077* -0.095 0.046 -0.084 0.044 -0.045 0.070 
 (0.098) (0.038) (0.079) (0.047) (0.097) (0.065) (0.050) (0.068) 
Roman Catholic -
0.083*** 
0.034 -0.048 -0.001 0.011 0.015 -0.026 -0.089 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.100) (0.041) (0.037) (0.021) (0.053) (0.072) 
Female -0.021** -0.001 0.001 0.007 0.054** 0.098*** 0.124*** 0.107*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) 
Age 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001* -0.003** -
0.004*** 
-0.002** -0.001* 
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.150*** 0.441*** 0.559*** 0.316*** 1.851*** 1.402*** 1.206*** 1.091*** 
 (0.020) (0.036) (0.081) (0.025) (0.020) (0.035) (0.062) (0.109) 
         
Observations 5,254 21,676 4,726 18,041 5,202 22,320 4,612 17,774 
Number of 
countries/regions 
6 20 5 10 6 21 5 10 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.058 0.026 0.011 0.002 0.051 0.075 0.067 0.050 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 The role of dominant religion – hard work and determination  
 Hard work Determination 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion 0.031 -0.026 0.003 -0.260** 0.045** 0.019 0.092 0.061 
 (0.035) (0.025) (0.110) (0.086) (0.013) (0.032) (0.080) (0.127) 
Others -0.064* 0.019 -0.006 -0.150** -0.115** -0.064* 0.127 -0.030 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.104) (0.056) (0.039) (0.037) (0.096) (0.125) 
Buddhist -
0.336*** 
0.114**  0.064*** -0.113 -0.048  -0.069 
 (0.076) (0.049)  (0.005) (0.057) (0.060)  (0.144) 
Hindu 0.150 0.059  -0.089** 0.317** 0.185  0.065 
 (0.152) (0.292)  (0.036) (0.108) (0.249)  (0.130) 
Jew -
0.154*** 
0.014 -0.038 -
0.548*** 
-
0.203*** 
-0.047 0.124 0.100* 
 (0.006) (0.099) (0.107) (0.149) (0.014) (0.059) (0.171) (0.052) 
Muslim 0.216 0.183*** 0.367* -
0.191*** 
-0.010 -0.090 -0.144 -0.002 
 (0.121) (0.027) (0.158) (0.041) (0.140) (0.057) (0.082) (0.127) 
Orthodox 0.021 -0.028 -0.010 -0.188** -0.073 -0.003 0.121 0.096 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.103) (0.061) (0.073) (0.036) (0.080) (0.109) 
Roman Catholic 0.036 0.006 -0.040 -
0.244*** 
-0.041 -0.032 0.098 -0.069 
 (0.042) (0.020) (0.119) (0.051) (0.035) (0.029) (0.092) (0.134) 
Female -0.061** -
0.037*** 
-0.002 -0.046** -0.013 -
0.031*** 
-0.030* 0.013 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001** -0.0004 -0.0005* -0.002** 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0005) 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.155*** 0.513*** 0.537*** 0.858*** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.233* 0.170 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.096) (0.065) (0.049) (0.029) (0.085) (0.149) 
         
Observations 5,254 21,678 4,726 15,794 5,254 21,675 4,726 15,794 
Number of 
countries/regions 
6 20 5 9 6 20 5 9 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.016 0.022 0.058 0.009 0.017 0.026 0.038 0.009 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
36  Lenka Filipova 
Table 9 The role of dominant religion – justifiable cheating on taxes 
and accepting a bribe 
 Justifiable cheating on taxes Justifiable accepting a bribe 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion 0.055 0.412*** 0.319 -
1.594*** 
0.085* 0.177** 0.082 -
0.464*** 
 (0.174) (0.115) (0.371) (0.312) (0.042) (0.073) (0.351) (0.110) 
Others -0.501** -0.079 0.293 -
1.747*** 
-0.268** -0.149 0.111 -0.521** 
 (0.177) (0.142) (0.508) (0.434) (0.097) (0.099) (0.385) (0.200) 
Buddhist 0.252 -0.248  -0.804 1.355* 0.363  0.215 
 (0.558) (0.446)  (1.029) (0.535) (0.409)  (0.815) 
Hindu 0.392 0.751  -
1.926*** 
0.008 1.457  -
0.585*** 
 (0.463) (1.618)  (0.334) (0.331) (1.615)  (0.105) 
Jew 0.038 0.151 0.575 -
1.579*** 
0.664*** 0.186 -0.299 -
0.560*** 
 (0.075) (0.388) (0.393) (0.268) (0.034) (0.346) (0.628) (0.110) 
Muslim -0.596 -0.284 1.638** -
1.940*** 
-0.284 -0.089 0.580** -
0.560*** 
 (0.683) (0.574) (0.510) (0.420) (0.163) (0.570) (0.173) (0.132) 
Orthodox -0.300 0.226 0.394 -
1.714*** 
0.045 -0.393** 0.021 -
0.956*** 
 (0.181) (0.346) (0.403) (0.460) (0.146) (0.165) (0.291) (0.166) 
Roman Catholic -0.051 0.195 0.568 -
1.764*** 
0.063 0.068 0.260 -0.202 
 (0.094) (0.115) (0.668) (0.441) (0.074) (0.080) (0.440) (0.186) 
Female -
0.591*** 
-
0.263*** 
-0.174** -0.130** -
0.179*** 
-
0.157*** 
-0.144** -0.024 
 (0.106) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.026) (0.028) (0.045) (0.022) 
Age -
0.021*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.006*** 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.012*** 
-
0.013*** 
-
0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.868*** 3.314*** 3.138*** 3.720*** 2.072*** 2.651*** 2.364*** 2.103*** 
 (0.247) (0.139) (0.277) (0.372) (0.148) (0.139) (0.368) (0.134) 
         
Observations 5,240 22,329 4,582 11,355 5,245 22,371 4,590 14,974 
Number of 
countries/regions 
6 21 5 8 6 21 5 10 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.045 0.022 0.032 0.009 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.006 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 The role of dominant religion – confidence in major compa-
nies and firms and freedom 
 Confidence in major companies Firms and freedom 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox  
Religion: b Protestant  
No religion 0.120** 0.147*** -0.130 0.530*** 0.421** 0.069 1.352**  
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.292) (0.100) (0.145) (0.213) (0.158)  
Others -0.030 0.131** -0.890 0.197* 0.297 -0.089 1.589**  
 (0.086) (0.049) (0.548) (0.105) (0.259) (0.376) (0.336)  
Buddhist 0.469 0.173  0.409*** -
0.294*** 
-
2.812*** 
  
 (0.366) (0.206)  (0.024) (0.053) (0.217)   
Hindu -0.131** -0.009  0.377*** -0.979 -0.727**   
 (0.024) (0.477)  (0.062) (1.331) (0.301)   
Jew 0.109** -0.032 0.015 0.298* 0.263*** 0.792* -0.143  
 (0.025) (0.143) (0.383) (0.154) (0.052) (0.388) (0.220)  
Muslim 0.128 0.168* 0.026 0.492*** -0.101 -0.044 1.760**  
 (0.113) (0.083) (0.205) (0.072) (0.352) (0.307) (0.286)  
Orthodox -0.117 0.054 -0.099 0.654*** -
0.442*** 
0.241 1.213**  
 (0.083) (0.056) (0.180) (0.088) (0.078) (0.375) (0.232)  
Roman Catholic 0.068 0.039 -0.161 0.385*** 0.289 -0.070 -0.023  
 (0.076) (0.037) (0.161) (0.076) (0.146) (0.157) (0.537)  
Female 0.052*** 0.046* -0.046** -0.066** 0.325*** 0.276*** 0.509*  
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.009) (0.029) (0.058) (0.064) (0.121)  
Age 0.003*** -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.002 0.005* 0.005*  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 2.511*** 2.615*** 3.168*** 2.163*** 4.555*** 6.257*** 5.975***  
 (0.042) (0.064) (0.293) (0.121) (0.135) (0.216) (0.596)  
         
Observations 3,288 15,489 2,564 12,582 4,016 13,187 2,724  
Number of 
countries/regions 
4 15 3 9 5 14 3  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.010 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.020 0.024 0.051  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Muslim countries not included referring to firms and freedom – question 
asked only in one country and with no observations in Protestant and other religious 
categories except Muslim and Others. 
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Table 11 The role of dominant religion – private vs state ownership of 
business and inequality of income 
 Private vs state ownership of business Inequality of income 
 Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim Protestant Catholic Orthodox Muslim 
Religion: b Protestant 
No religion 0.387 0.301 -0.101 0.459 -0.314** -0.244 0.676 1.555*** 
 (0.344) (0.194) (0.689) (0.337) (0.095) (0.160) (0.939) (0.425) 
Others 0.079 -0.010 -0.133 -0.312* 0.324 -0.236 0.919 2.177*** 
 (0.221) (0.229) (0.728) (0.168) (0.377) (0.208) (0.625) (0.172) 
Buddhist 0.065 -0.402  -1.520* -
1.010*** 
0.305  0.042 
 (0.108) (0.398)  (0.782) (0.087) (0.361)  (1.164) 
Hindu 1.657*** 0.423  0.143 -
1.366*** 
2.395***  1.942*** 
 (0.074) (0.248)  (0.112) (0.116) (0.360)  (0.168) 
Jew 0.148* 0.704 0.705 -1.049* -
0.525*** 
-0.622 -1.069 1.057** 
 (0.060) (0.538) (0.680) (0.533) (0.052) (0.374) (0.845) (0.359) 
Muslim 0.084 0.079 0.831 -0.109 1.427** -0.928 0.138 2.021*** 
 (0.393) (0.199) (0.581) (0.108) (0.292) (0.615) (0.805) (0.091) 
Orthodox -0.441** 0.565 0.122 0.033 0.740** 0.382 0.626 1.816*** 
 (0.136) (0.773) (0.623) (0.044) (0.190) (0.424) (0.713) (0.326) 
Roman Catholic 0.315** -0.032 -0.309 -0.314 -0.240 -0.256 0.452 2.050*** 
 (0.086) (0.185) (0.421) (0.194) (0.124) (0.191) (0.481) (0.128) 
Female 0.485** 0.348*** 0.534* 0.382*** -
0.285*** 
-
0.166*** 
0.034 0.040 
 (0.141) (0.057) (0.161) (0.066) (0.032) (0.055) (0.148) (0.052) 
Age -0.002 -0.004 0.011** -0.0005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.011 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.560*** 6.177*** 5.601** 6.808*** 4.467*** 4.583*** 3.831*** 3.314*** 
 (0.080) (0.285) (0.820) (0.417) (0.482) (0.203) (0.637) (0.307) 
         
Observations 3,292 15,924 2,730 17,110 3,409 18,874 3,612 17,323 
Number of 
countries/regions 
4 16 3 10 4 18 4 10 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.022 0.022 0.057 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.044 0.007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
